With the emergence of physical monitoring systems and their use for smart cities, new security concerns arise due to the sensitive nature of the data produced by the sensor devices of these systems, which makes the smart city applications a prime target for cyber attacks. However, securing these devices is very challenging given the fact that they are resource-constrained, and deployed in physically unsecured environments. In this paper, we propose a secure scheme for cloud-based smart city surveillance system providing a lightweight sensor authentication protocol based on Physical Unclonable Functions and securing the exchanged data through the different components of this infrastructure.
INTRODUCTION
With the emergence of smart cities over the world, there is a great need for services that ensure the protection of citizens and cities' assets. In fact, these services run in a dynamic environment containing sets of physical supervisory systems, which in turn can be managed by different providers to serve several actors. However, the inherent complexities of such environments raise several challenges for the implementation of smart city applications. These challenges are mostly caused by the massive amount of data that are generated by the sensors. The cloud technology presents an attractive solution to face this challenge since it provides powerful computing resources and elastic storage capacities (Schleicher, et al., 2016) .
Despite the benefits of the cloud, the smart city applications are still suffering from security threats given the fact that the sensitive nature of sensor data makes them a prime target for cyber attacks. Therefore, implementing security solutions is very crucial to ensure efficient and reliable services for smart cities. In particular, authentication and encryption services are required to provide both device and data exchange security. However, the sensor devices are endowed with limited processing, memory, and energy resources which make them unable to support complex security mechanisms (Wallrabenstein, 2016) . In this context, several works considered Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) as an effective solution for resourceconstrained devices that requires lower computational and storage capabilities. In (Kalra & Sood, 2015) , the authors presented an ECC based mutual authentication protocol for secure communication between embedded devices and cloud servers. In (Hu, et al., 2017) , the authors proposed a secure cloud-based architecture for health monitoring using IoT devices which achieves authentication and data security using ECC digital signature.
However, the aforecited schemes call for the storage of the secret key inside the Non-Volatile Memory (NVM) of devices, while the sensors can be deployed in a hostile environment and be the target of many physical attacks. To thwart these attacks, the sensor devices can be equipped with tamper resistant hardware. However, theses solutions can be too expensive to be practical in many smart city applications. Several researches were proposed (Lao, et al., 2017) , (Wallrabenstein, 2015) , (Aman, et al., 2017) and (Wallrabenstein, 2016) focusing on the use of a low-cost solutions to protect sensor devices from tampering. These solutions are based on the use of a Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) which consists in an on-demand extraction of secrets from complex properties of hardware, rather than storing them in a NVM. In fact, a PUF produces to a given input (or challenge) an output (or response) which is unique due to inter-chip variation that is difficult or impossible to model. The challenge and response pairs (CRPs) of a PUF are used to generate chipunique signatures for an authentication system (Lao, et al., 2017) .
In this work, we propose a security scheme for cloud-based smart city surveillance architecture leveraging an extension of the PUF-based authentication system proposed in (Wallrabenstein, 2016) . The architecture was presented by our work in (Yosra, et al., 2018 ) that provides global monitoring services ( ) for smart cities built on virtual sensors ( ), which are created by different brokers. A provides an indirect measurements by processing data collected by physical sensors ( ) deployed by different physical supervisory systems ( ). The main goal of this paper is to design a lightweight scheme involving more than two actors (i.e., sensor devices, broker and provider) to perform secure authentication and key management for sensors in cloud-based environment, in addition to guaranteeing sensors' anonymity. The proposal exploits, firstly, the ECC to enable the sensor device to generate pair of asymmetric key and the PUF hardware to secure the private key from tampering, and then the Zero knowledge Proof (ZKP) to prove the authenticity of the generated public key. The generated asymmetric keys are used to encrypt and sign the exchanged data.
The main contribution of this paper is four fold: 1) A lightweight authentication scheme for sensor devices that preserves their anonymity in cloud environment; 2) A low cost tamper resistance solution for sensor devices based on the use of unclonable function; 3) The proof of the real involvement of sensors in data collection; and 4) The integrity and confidentiality of the exchanged data in a cloud sensor based architecture.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the security requirements for cloud-based smart city surveillance system. Section 3 details the proposed architecture and the functions ensured by its components. Section 4 presents our proposed authentication and key distribution scheme. The next section provides a security analysis and validation of the proposed scheme. Section 6 concludes the paper.
SECURITY REQUREMENTS FOR CLOUD-BASED SMART CITY SURVEILLANCE
In this section, we detail the security requirement to design sensor authentication scheme in cloud-based smart city surveillance system.
Anonymous Sensor
Authentication. The virtualization enables GMS to make use of different without knowing their identity. However, it is required to prove that the used data are collected by a trusted sensor. Thus, sensor devices should be authenticated anonymously.
Low Computational and Energy Operation. The computation power and the battery capacity of sensor are limited and may be insufficient for the processing of security algorithms. Therefore, a security scheme for sensor devices should involve low resource and energy consumption.
Tamper Resistance. Given the fact that the sensor devices can be deployed in remote unattended places, security solution should be able to detect any attempt to tamper with them.
Freshness and Integrity of Sensing Data. The surveillance applications requires firstly, the freshness of the used data to guarantee that it is very much recent and no old data have been replayed. Secondly, the integrity of the used data to guarantee that it has not been altered in transit.
CLOUD-BASED SMART CITY SURVEILLANCE SYSTEM ARHITECTURE
The proposed cloud-based smart city surveillance architecture is composed of three actors: ) Physical Supervisory System ( ) /provider ) A broker of and ) A Logical Supervisory System (
). An architectural map of the proposed architecture is shown in Figure 1 . In the following we detail the role of each actor.
Physical Supervisory System / Provider
A typical is a centralized system that ensures real-time monitoring of an infrastructure process using a set of heterogeneous sensors. The acts as a provider that allows the reuse of its by different external systems with different configurations. It also interacts with a trusted Authentication System ( ) to enroll and to authenticate its . The is composed of enrollment servers that ensure the authentication of and the generation of shared keys to be used to secure the data exchange. Figure 1: Cloud-based smart city surveillance architecture.
Broker of Virtual Sensors
The broker of is the intermediary between the /providers and the . According to the request of , the broker selects providers to use their with the appropriate configurations. It creates a enabling the processing of the data generated by the selected . The broker also maintains an archive of the sensed data collected from the different PSSs.
Logical Supervisory System
The provides s for heterogeneous and distributed infrastructures making the use of provided by different brokers of . The supervision ensured by this is based on the analysis and the processing of data produced by a set of .
SECURE DATA EXCHANGE IN CLOUD-BASED SMART CITY SYSTEM
This section describes the proposed PUF-based authentication and key distribution scheme for cloud-based smart city surveillance, in addition to an overview about the PUFs concept.
Physical Unclonable Function Overview
The PUF performs a mapping from a challenge to a unique response which depends on the unique characteristics of the physical hardware on which it is executed. Several authentication schemes have been proposed based on the PUF (Aman, et al., 2017) . They use the fact that only a user and a sensor device know a CRP. To authenticate a sensor, the user has to tell the device in clear his challenge so that it can get the response. Thus a man in the middle can hear the challenge, get the response from the PUF device and use it to spoof the PUF device. The Controlled PUF (CPUF), which is a combination of a PUF and an Integrated Circuit (IC) bound together such that an attacker has no access to the communication between the PUF and the IC. Any attempt to force them apart will damage the PUF. The IC completely governs the PUF input and output and reveals only indirect information derived from the output.
PUF-based Authentication and Key Distribution Scheme
The proposed scheme is based on ECC which is a suitable solution for resource-constrained sensors.
We define an elliptic curve over a field of prime order , and a base point of order , where = 2 + 1. The proposed scheme is also based on a CPUF implemented by the used sensor devices and a hash function denoted by . We assume that the is a trusted entity that authenticates the actors of our architecture and that generates the secret keys to be used during the data exchange. In addition, each provider has a pair of keys ( , ) generated by the and to be used during the exchange of data with sensors.
Enrollment Phase
This phase is executed in a secure environment by the . The sensors are pre-configured with a virtual identity . Once the enrollment phase is finished, the device deletes from its memory. Figure 2 shows the steps of this phase, which are detailed in the following: 1. The generates a Pre-challenge and sends ( ) to the sensor device. 2. The sensor selects rand from and calculates a challenge = ⊕ ( ) and = ( , , , , ) which is used as input to the PUF to generate the response . Next, it generates a public key = .
, where the private key is selected from . It applies an Error Correction Code (ECC) over the private key, and blinds this value with , in a way that the final helper value = ⊕ ( ) leaks no information about the private key. The device stores and in the NVM, and sends to the the public key , the rand and its . 3. The ES saves the public key and rand with the correspondent and the identity of its provider .
Sensor Authentication Phase
The device authentication is performed through a ZKP protocol. In this phase, the verifies whether the sensor can re-generate the private key involving its PUF. Figure 3 shows the steps of this phase, which are detailed in the following:
1. The recovers the relevant public key , and using . It generates a nonce and 1 and calculates ( ) and = ( | 1 | ( ) | ). Next, the ES encrypts 1 , , , and using a secret key , which is shared between the ES and the provider that owns the sensor device. 2. The PSS decrypts the received message with and transfers to the relevant device 1 , , and . 3. The device reads from its memory and . It calculates ( ) = ⊕ and verifies the received . This enables the sensor device to authenticate the , given that it is the only entity that knows the and . Then, the device calculates = ( , , , , ) and gets its correspondent response from its PUF. It re-generates its private key using an error decoding, = ( ⊕ ). It also calculates its public key = .
. 4. After re-generating the asymmetric key pair, the device selects from and calculates = .
. Then, It calculates ′ = ( , , , ) and = + ′.
. It also calculates 1 = ( | | | ( )) and generates 2 . Finally, it sends 2 , 1 , , to the /Provider. 5. The adds its identity and the to the received message and encrypts them with . It adds to the encrypted message in clear its and sends them to the . 6. Using , the retrieves and decrypts the message. Then, it verifies 1 and calculates " = ( , , , ) and ′ = . − ".
. The compares and ′. If they are equal, it sends an acknowledge to the provider. Else, it refuses to authenticate the device. Once a sensor is authenticated, the parameters used for sensor authentication can be renewed.
Data Transfer Phase
The data collected by a sensor are transferred to the broker without revealing the sensor identity. However, the broker should make sure that the received data are collected from an involved and an authentic sensor. To this end, we proposed a protocol that enables a broker to authenticate a sensor through a digital signature without revealing its identity. The sensor signs data with its private key that it re-generates using its PUF. In the other hand, the broker verifies the sensor's signature using a public key provided by the . The validity of the key pair ( , ) is verified by the ES through the sensor authentication described above.
The proposed signature protocol is based on the ElGamal digital signature algorithm described by (Wallrabenstein, 2016) . Figure 4 shows the steps of this phase, which are detailed in the following:
1. The device reads from its memory and and re-generates its private key and public as described at step 3 in the authentication phase. It selects a random curve point from = {( . , . )}.
Next, it sets = ( ) = . where ( ) denotes the −coordinate of the point . It also sets = −1 ( ℎ ( |°) + . ) where ° is a sequence number which is initially synchronized between the broker and the device. The device creates the message 4 starting from , and data. It encypts the message 4 and a random value 1 using the public key of the provider. It adds to the encrypted message 1 in clear and sends them to its provider.
2. The provider decrypts the message its and adds ° and its identity to the decrypted message. Then, it encrypts them with the secret key shared with the concerned broker. It also adds in clear its identity . Finally, it sends them to the broker.
Using
, it selects the appropriate and decrypts the message. Then, it retrieves the public key using and verifies the signature by calculating = .
( |°). −1 + −1 .
SECURITY ANALYSIS AND SYSTEM VALIDATION
In this section, we will analyze and validate the robustness of the proposed scheme against a set of attacks.
 Low Cost Tamper Resistant. The device uses and with its PUF to regenerate its private key instead of stored it in the NVM. Hence, is physically obfuscated and only exists in memory when needed for a cryptographic operation. Besides, we use a CPUF that makes an inseparable link between an IC and a PUF's input-output mapping, an attacker that attempts to probe the circuit will irreversibly modify the physical variations in the IC, which in turn changes the PUF mapping and prevents regeneration of the private key. Thus, PUF circuits are a low-cost solution for tamper resistance to resource-constrained devices.  Sensor Anonymous Authentication. The broker authenticates a sensor device through the verification of its signature using the public key sent by the . is generated based on a private key which is only known by the sensor device given that the regeneration of requires the involvement of its unique function PUF. Based on this fact, the authenticates the sensor using ZKP protocol. Besides, the sensor device is identified by a virtual identity which is only known by the provider and the enrollment server. Thus, the broker authenticates the sensor device without knowing its identity and its physical specifications.
 Resistance to Replay Attack. An attacker can replay previous messages exchanged by the sensor device to the broker. But, the broker can detect the invalidity of the message because messages are signed using the private key that can be generated only by ℎe sensor using its PUF and contain new sequence number generated for new message. Besides, to prevent replay attacks on the message exchanged between actors, new nonces are generated to guarantee the freshness of each session.
 Resistance to Impersonation Attack. The proposed scheme implements ZKP protocol to authenticate a sensor device which allows the to verify that the sensor knows the private key without disclosing it. A sensor can prove that it knows the correct by re-generating it involving its implemented PUF. Given that the PUF is unique for each device, an adversary cannot re-generate to impersonate the .  Resistance to Man In the Middle Attack. an attacker cannot perform a MITM attack in the communication between the and a sensor because at each time each one checks that the other knows the and the − ℎ used to generate the challenge saved by the sensor. An attacker is not also able to decrypt several messages because they are encrypted by a secret key already calculated by the . On top of that, our scheme is based on CPUF which prevents an attacker, even though he determined the challenge saved by the sensor, to probe the device and get the response.
CONCLUSION
We proposed in this paper a secure authentication scheme for cloud-based smart city surveillance system. The proposal solution exploits, firstly, ECC to enable the sensor device to generate a pair of asymmetric key and the PUF hardware to secure the private key from tampering, and then ZKP to prove the authenticity of the generated public key. Moreover, the generated asymmetric keys are leveraged to provide encryption and signature mechanism to protect exchanged data with sensors while coping with their resources-limitations. In addition, our proposed solution enables to authenticate anonymously a sensor in the cloud environment. In a future work, we will extend our proposed scheme to support the authentication of virtual sensors created starting from a dynamic set of mobile and heterogeneous sensor devices.
